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I.

INTRODUCTION

The George W. Bush administration responded to the terrorist
attacks of September 11th with far-reaching assertions of unilateral
executive power, power it insisted was substantially free of judicial or
legislative checks. As Scott Shane wrote in the December 17, 2005 New
York Times, “[f]rom the Government’s detention of [American citizens
with severely limited access to courts, and none to attorney, families, or
friends] as [alleged] ‘enemy combatants’ to the just disclosed
eavesdropping in the United States without court warrants, the
administration has relied on an unusually expansive interpretation of the
president’s authority.”1 The Times article lists additional examples
including the plan to try those accused of terrorism before military
tribunals and “the use of severe interrogation techniques, including some
banned by international agreements, on [alleged] Al Qaeda figures.”2
From the broad perspective of the struggle for Anglo-American
liberty, the claim of George W. Bush is reminiscent of claims to absolute
executive power made by the Stuart kings. The Stuart kings also claimed
broad unchecked executive power, including the power to incarcerate
British citizens without effective access to the courts.3 The claim was
repudiated in the Act of Habeas Corpus of 1679.4 Eighteenth century
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Americans saw the Stuart monarchs as tyrants.5
Of course, the Stuart kings – James, I and Charles I– are not the
model apologists for unchecked presidential power embrace. Instead they
appeal to Abraham Lincoln, a revered American president . They throw
Lincoln’s shawl around new claims for absolute power and paste his beard
on it. Lincoln did exert executive and military power in extraordinary and
unprecedented ways. This essay is an effort to explain why we should
reject the clever and alluring argument that Lincoln’s example justifies
arbitrary executive power in times of crisis. It seeks to answer those, like
Professor Michael Paulsen, who wrap claims such as those made by
George W. Bush in the mantel of Abraham Lincoln.
Over the next century or so, some American presidents may not be
as trustworthy as Abraham Lincoln. But the problem with the invocation
of Lincoln’s conduct is deeper. Some of the actions Lincoln took are
utterly unacceptable for a democratic society. Furthermore, Lincoln
himself was unwilling to carry his necessity argument to its logical
conclusion. A closer look at a few of the policies embraced by the Bush
administration gives a better idea of the policies Lincoln is being used to
defend. After briefly looking at some of these policies, I will consider
Professor Michael Paulsen’s invocation of Lincoln to support sweeping
executive power.
One example of the Bush administration doctrine is the case of
Yaser Hamdi. Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, had gone to
Afghanistan, been captured by the Northern Alliance, and transferred to
the American army. The government claimed Hamdi was “affiliated”
with the Taliban as a member of its armed forces for which he would fight
“if necessary.”6
The government’s account was apparently based on information
from the warlords of the Northern Alliance. There are reasons to be
skeptical that the Northern Alliance warlords consistently transmitted
accurate information to the American military. According to a report in
the Boston Globe,
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Pakistani intelligence sources said Northern Alliance
commanders could receive $5,000 for each Taliban
prisoner and [$]20,000 for a[n Al] Qaeda fighter. As a
result bounty hunters rounded up any men who came near
the battlegrounds and forced them to confess.7
Of course, there are also reasons to be skeptical of Hamdi’s account.
The government physically restrained Hamdi, holding him
virtually incommunicado for about two years. Until shortly before the
Supreme Court reviewed his case he was denied access to counsel and his
family. As a “matter of discretion” the government finally allowed Hamdi
to have monitored meetings with counsel, but insisted that access to a
lawyer was not legally required.8
Hamdi’s version came to light only after the Bush administration
(faced with a Supreme Court mandated hearing on the merits of his
detention) had released him on condition that he renounce his American
citizenship, go to Saudi Arabia, where he had held dual citizenship, and
not return to the United States.
Hamdi said he had gone to Afghanistan for religious studies and
joined a camp where he received such instruction, together with training
in small arms. When the war broke out, he attempted to leave, but was
unable to do so because the border had been sealed. Hamdi further
asserted that he had not been fighting or intending to, but had been
captured by the Northern Alliance and sold to the Americans for $20,000.9
Hamdi’s father had discovered his plight and sought habeas corpus,
including an evidentiary hearing at which the court would consider the
accuracy of the government’s assertions.
At any rate, by the time his case was decided Hamdi had been
imprisoned without charge, hearing, or trial in the Norfolk and Charleston
Naval jails for about two years, on the allegation that he was an enemy
combatant who had been affiliated with the forces fighting against the
United States in Afghanistan. Hamdi contended that the claim was false,
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that he was caught in the wrong place at the wrong time, and that he had
never been a Taliban or Al Qaeda fighter. A central issue in his case was
whether due process required a meaningful opportunity to contest the
government’s claims that Hamid was in fact an enemy combatant.
At the least, if Hamdi was not an “enemy combatant” and if
traditional notions of liberty were followed, he should have been released
or charged with a crime and given the criminal procedure guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. So whether Hamdi was an “enemy combatant” was a
crucial question.
The Bush claim of power to imprison American citizens without
a due process hearing raised (and raises) the most fundamental issues of
liberty under law. (With Orwellian aplomb, the administration contended
that Hamdi’s incommunicado interrogation, conducted with no access to
counsel, relatives, or friends, was a constitutionally adequate hearing.)10
While Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan, the Bush administration’s
claim of power to incarcerate American citizens without a meaningful
hearing to determine status was not limited by the location where the
alleged enemy combatant was seized.
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld11 involved the power of the president to imprison an American
citizen for years without allowing him either a trial, meaningful access to
the courts, or a meaningful due process hearing to determine his status.
The imprisonment was based on the president’s labeling Hamdi an enemy
combatant. The power to detain foreign soldiers captured in an armed
conflict who are fighting against the Untied States is uncontroversial.
According to the administration, the court review was limited to
whether the administration asserted that Hamdi was an enemy combatant
(it did) and whether the Constitution and the laws permitted a citizen the
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government claimed to be an enemy combatant to be held as Hamdi was.
(The administration insisted it did). By the Bush administration view, the
Constitution and laws allowed this procedure and the courts lacked power
to go behind the government’s assertions in order to decide whether a
person really was an enemy combatant.
In time of war, the President, as Commander in Chief, has the
authority to capture and detain enemy combatants for the
duration of hostilities. That includes enemy combatants
presumed to be United States citizens. ...
Petitioners' challenge to the military's determination that Hamdi
is an enemy combatant is ... without merit. An enemy
combatant who is a presumed citizen and who is detained in
this country is entitled to judicial review of his detention by
way of habeas corpus. In such a proceeding, a habeas petitioner
may raise legal challenges to the individual's detention, such as
petitioners' arguments that the Commander in Chief does not
have the authority to detain a captured enemy combatant who
is an American citizen, or that such a detention is barred by 18
U.S.C. 4001(a). However, the scope of judicial review that is
available concerning the military's determination that an
individual is an enemy combatant is necessarily limited by the
fundamental separation-of-powers concerns raised by a court's
review or second-guessing of such a core military judgment in
wartime.12

So while the Bush administration conceded that American citizens seized
as enemy combatants had access to habeas corpus, the concession was of
little significance. The citizen could be held incommunicado and denied
access to a lawyer. If a relative discovered his fate and brought a petition
for habeas corpus, according to the administration, the court should
dismiss the writ on the bald assertion by the executive that the person was
an enemy combatant. By the administration’s view of the law, upheld by
five members of the Court, it had the power to detain American citizens
who were enemy combatants. The Bush administration also denied that
any real process was required to determine if the person really was an
enemy combatant. But if the Court held against it on that point (which it
12
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did), the administration contended a hearsay affidavit was conclusive and
that the detained citizen had no right to a hearing to challenge its
accuracy.
The Bush administration’s concession of a right to habeas corpus
was disingenuous. It envisioned a judicial habeas process in which a
court would not hear from the prisoner on a crucial issue in his
case–whether the facts justified holding him without the safeguards
required in a criminal trial. Indeed, it envisioned a habeas proceeding in
which the court would never see the imprisoned citizen, and the citizen
would never see a lawyer.
As Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion noted, the government
contended “in light of the extraordinary constitutional interests at stake,”
that “‘respect for separation of powers’” ought to “eliminate entirely any
individual process.... Under this review, a court would assume the
accuracy of the Government’s articulated basis for Hamdi’s detention and
assess only whether that articulated basis was a legitimate one.”13
The government’s fall back position was that the only question for
the courts was whether there was “some evidence” to support the
assertion that Hamdi was an enemy combatant.14 In short, by the fall back
position, the court should accept without question the government’s
hearsay affidavit, and decide only whether the government’s untested
version of the facts justified Hamdi’s incarceration.
The Court rejected the government’s due process contentions,
though the amount of process required by the controlling plurality opinion
was limited–allowing for the possibility of a military hearing, shifting the
burden of proof to Hamdi, and allowing hearsay evidence.15 Justices
Scalia and Stevens dissented. They said that, for citizens, the Constitution
required release or a criminal trial with full due process protections,
unless the Congress suspended the writ of habeas corpus.16 Justices
Souter and Ginsberg dissented as well, arguing that the congressional act
authorizing the president to use all necessary force did not authorize
detention of American citizens without judicial process and that the
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detention violated an act of Congress.17
Another example of President Bush’s remarkable assertions of
executive power came when he signed the McCain bill outlawing torture.
In his signing declaration, the President seemed to reserve the legal right
to ignore the provisions of the law.
The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of
the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary
executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent
with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which
will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress
and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the
American people from further terrorist attacks.18

The declaration should be read in light of the administration’s
earlier (and partially withdrawn) memo setting out an extraordinarily
limited definition of what amounted to torture. That memo announced
that congressional laws seeking to limit the coercive methods the
president chose to employ would be unconstitutional. It would be
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“unconstitutional” to “seek to prevent the President from gaining the
intelligence he believes necessary to prevent attacks on the United
States.”19
The Bush administration has justified its claim to largely
unchecked presidential power based on emergency and necessity. The
claim is as extreme as any ever asserted in American history. Indeed, the
claim is more extreme because it is not limited to a comparatively brief
emergency. The Civil War and World War II, for example, involved
extraordinary assertions of power.20 But, in each of those episodes, the
wartime crisis involved an enemy state which could be defeated by
capture of its territory. As a result, the war could be and was of limited
duration. Lincoln used the expected temporary nature of the Civil War to
justify his extraordinary assertions of power–analogizing his measures to
medicine to be prescribed during illness.21 In contrast, the problem of
terrorism is likely to last for many, many years –perhaps for hundreds of
years. So the Bush administration is asserting unilateral and unchecked
presidential power for the foreseeable future.
The claims of the Bush administration are in serious tension with
traditional ideas of liberty. As Justice Scalia noted in dissent in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, “The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system
of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at
the will of the Executive.”22 Alexander Hamilton thought habeas corpus
was a crucial and preeminent guarantee of liberty because “the practice of
arbitrary imprisonments [has] been, in all ages, the favorite and most
formidable instruments of tyranny.”23
19
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The framers recognized circumstances (invasion or rebellion) in
which the writ might be suspended. They placed the power to suspend
in Article I, section 9. The grant of power to Congress was designed to
ensure that the executive would not have the unilateral power to deprive
citizens of liberty.
Of course, the requirement that Congress may suspend the writ in
cases of invasion or rebellion is imperfect. Congress may be too willing
to acquiesce in invasions of liberty. (During the Civil War Congress did
attempt to put substantial limits on the president’s power to imprison
without trial.)24 In any case, the requirement of congressional action is a
substantial limit on unilateral, substantially unchecked executive power
to imprison American citizens. As a safeguard to liberty, it is certainly a
substantial improvement over putting the power in the hands of a single
person.
Similarly, courts can also fail to protect liberty and often have.
But, as Justice Brandeis noted, separation of powers is one important
device “to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power...and to save the
people from autocracy.”25
According to Professor Paulsen, the Constitution contains a
doctrine of necessity that trumps almost all of its other provisions–at least
in cases of extraordinary necessity. Paulsen advances forceful arguments
to support his conclusion–to the extent that logic is the test.
The Constitution is not a suicide pact; and, consequently, its
provisions should not be construed to make it one.... The
Constitution should be construed to avoid constitutional
implosion; it should not lightly be given a disabling, selfdestructive interpretation. ... [P]riority [must] be given to the
preservation of the nation whose Constitution it is, for the sake
of preserving constitutional government over the long haul,
even at the expense of specific constitutional provisions.26
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exercise the sweeping power this doctrine provides. That person is the
president. The president is the primary, and typically the ultimate, judge
of necessity.27 His oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
gives him the power, in cases of necessity, to ignore its “other” provisions
for the sake of the greater good.28 The “preserve, protect, and defend”
command “must take priority over practically any other constitutional rule
set forth in the document.”29 In effect, the Constitution contains a
provision, hidden in the president’s oath, that gives him sweeping
emergency powers, including freedom to disregard court orders.30
Paulsen cites an authority to justify his expansive claims of executive
power. His authority is Abraham Lincoln.
Curiously, Paulsen embraces a couple of potential checks on
presidential power. These include the provision for periodic elections and
impeachment.31 He fails to explain why these checks need not bow to the
inexorable logic of necessity. At any rate, the checks are likely to be
anemic when one party controls both the presidency and the Congress.
Of course, temporary action may be required from the president
because there may not be time for other branches to act. But the Paulsen
thesis goes far beyond that.
In spite of its appeal and apparent logical force, I find the doctrine
dangerous. I don’t deny that presidents have sometimes (even often)
ignored constitutional and legal limitations in pursuit of what they saw as
a greater good, a concept they easily confused with partisan advantage.32
Nor do I deny that this has happened in times of crisis. It is one thing to
recognize that, in exceedingly rare situations, presidents may act outside
of the Constitution and still be judged as having acted reasonably, if not
constitutionally. It is quite another to believe that the Constitution itself
allows the president to ignore its provisions in cases of emergency, in
effect in cases the president says he considers an emergency.
It is obvious, of course, that the emergency power proposed by
27
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Professor Paulsen under the necessity doctrine is currently of great
practical importance. Today the nation faces a grave threat, a “war” with
terrorists. But this “war” is different. The enemy has no state; capturing
leading terrorists does not end the threat; and technology has vastly
increased the potential for destruction. As in past wars and incidents of
terrorism,33 we face serious questions of personal liberty and the scope of
free speech.
As noted above, President George W. Bush claims that the war
power justifies suspension of basic civil liberties–such as habeas corpus,
right to counsel, and jury trial–in the cases of those American citizens the
president designates as unlawful combatants. The Supreme Court has
established some limits on the exercise of executive power, but
controversy is likely to continue.34
At present, a broad unilateral “emergency” power to disregard
constitutional limitations is an anomaly–viewed with deep suspicion. To
transform it to a constitutional power similar but superior to other
constitutional powers (which, unlike this one, are subject to limits in the
interest of liberty) makes such emergency decree power more likely to be
used and more defensible. Since these alleged “powers” have been
abused with some regularity, full acceptance of the necessity doctrine will
likely make things even worse. To his credit Paulsen discusses dangers
and the potential of abuse.35
To support his Constitution of Necessity, Paulsen repeatedly cites
33
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President Abraham Lincoln. “[I]f I am mistaken in all this,” he
concludes, “so was President Lincoln.”36
Here I will critique Professor Paulsen’s use of Lincoln to support
the case for necessity. I will focus on the case of Clement Vallandigham.
Paulsen obviously has mixed feelings about Lincoln’s handling of the
case. While he ultimately decides Lincoln was mistaken, he still mounts
a limited (and mistaken) defense of Lincoln’s Vallandigham analysis, if
not his result.
Lincoln says the things about necessity trumping other
constitutional provisions that Paulsen attributes to him. And Paulsen
goes a long way toward defending, or mitigating, Lincoln’s
extraordinarily repressive actions in the Vallandigham case. I see three
problems with citing Lincoln as authority for the necessity doctrine.
First: Lincoln assumed that he was exercising a brief, temporary
authority and one that was safe because he expected the necessity for it to
end soon. It is far from clear that Lincoln would have advocated
abandoning constitutional limitations for the foreseeable future.
Second: Paulsen concedes that Lincoln’s application of the
doctrine of necessity may sometimes have been mistaken. If Lincoln was
seriously mistaken in his application of the doctrine of necessity, it shows
Lincoln was quite capable of making gross mistakes in connection with
the very doctrine at issue. If so, the invocation of Lincoln as authority on
the subject should be viewed with caution. If Abraham Lincoln
misunderstood or abused the doctrine, how safe is it in other hands?
Paulsen has a powerful answer. All powers may be abused and that is no
reason to deny a power.37 Still, if abuses have quite often or even
typically accompanied the exercise of the alleged power, that should give
one pause before giving it a more respectable pedigree.
Third: In the end, Lincoln rejected the claim that the necessity of
preserving the Union justified overriding all other constitutional norms
and provisions. Specifically, as I discuss in Part VII, he rejected the idea
that the necessity of preserving the Union could justify suspending
elections. Citation of Lincoln to support the logic of the doctrine of
necessity needs to come to grips with his refusal to follow his logic to its
conclusion. If elections are (as Paulsen concedes) an exception to the
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doctrine of necessity, there is much less to the sweeping logical case for
the necessity claim than meets the eye.
Elections are supported by a larger system of political liberty. A
president who can imprison citizens without charge, access to a lawyer,
and the right to a jury trial can undermine an effective electoral system.
Surveillance of all political activity can substantially undermine an
electoral system, particularly if citizens know that the president can whisk
them away to solitary confinement, without access to courts, lawyers,
family or friends. And finally, of course, a very robust system of freedom
of speech is crucial to meaningful elections. In short, the election
exception entails protection of much more than an empty right to vote.
I will look briefly at Lincoln’s first announcement of the necessity
doctrine and then focus primarily on the Vallandigham case–the case of
the arrest of a Democratic politician for making an anti-war speech.
Professor Paulsen has also discussed the case.38
II.

LINCOLN’S EARLY EXERCISE AND INVOCATION OF THE
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.

Faced with the grave secession crisis and rebel guerilla warfare in
Maryland and elsewhere, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus.
Lincoln says that all laws were being disregarded. Must all laws be
allowed to fail to protect a single law from being violated? If he followed
that course, asks Lincoln, “would not the official oath be broken”?39
Still, Lincoln did not think the habeas provision of the
Constitution had been violated–because the Constitution itself provided
for suspension of the writ in cases of rebellion or invasion when the
public safety required it.40 So while Lincoln first invoked the doctrine of
necessity, he then suggested that its invocation was unnecessary, since the
Constitution explicitly provided for the suspension. What the
38

Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 698-701, (2004), a review of DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S
CONSTITUTION [hereinafter Paulsen, Interpretation]; Paulsen, Necessity, supra note 26
at 1280-81.
39
Id. at 1265.
40
CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 24 at 305(2000) (quoting Lincoln). For
extended treatment of the Lincoln Vallandigham controversy see CURTIS, FREE
SPEECH, supra and Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War
Speech During the Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 105 (1998).

14

LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

Constitution did not explicitly do was invest the president with that
power. Indeed, the power to suspend in cases of rebellion or invasion was
placed in Article I, together with other limits on the powers of Congress.
Congress was not in session, the situation was dire, and Lincoln
acted–and disregarded a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice
Taney.41
The Constitution certainly did not explicitly allow the president to
go beyond imprisoning without trial during invasion or rebellion: it did
not seem to allow him to subject civilians far from the combat zone to
military trials and convictions for violating military orders. That,
however, is what Lincoln sometimes did.
After Lincoln’s suspension, Congress met, and it ratified, but
limited, the suspension of the writ. It placed strong limits on the use of
such arrests. Specifically, Congress provided that a list of those arrested
should be provided to the courts. If the courts were open and functioning,
civilians arrested should be either indicted or released by the end of the
court term.42 The Lincoln administration ignored the congressional limits
in the case of civilians arrested by the military.43
Lincoln’s first urgent suspension in the face of rebel activity in
Maryland and elsewhere is the most defensible in constitutional terms.
There was a rebellion and in such cases the Constitution did provide for
suspension of the writ. Congress was not in session and not immediately
available. In this situation there is a plausible argument that Lincoln’s
actions were in accordance with the Constitution, even absent a necessity
gloss.
As to his decision to ignore the congressional limitations on his
suspension of habeas corpus for civilians arrested by the military outside
the theater of conflict, Lincoln actually needed the necessity doctrine.
But here his decision to ignore the law was not justified. Lincoln’s
decision to ignore congressional limits on the suspension of habeas
corpus can perhaps be justified by an appeal to an authority higher than
the law. It should not be justified by the claim that he acted
constitutionally. Of course, the Republicans in Congress did not impeach
their president.

41
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THE CASE OF CLEMENT VALLANDIGHAM

Clement Vallandigham was a racist, anti-war Democrat. In 1863,
after being gerrymandered and then defeated for Congress, Vallandigham
hoped to run for Governor of Ohio. On May 1, 1863 Clement
Vallandigham made a speech to a large Democratic meeting in Ohio. The
speech and the reaction of the Lincoln administration assured
Vallandigham a place in the history books.
In his speech, Vallandigham denounced the Civil War as “wicked,
cruel, and unnecessary.” It was a war “for the purpose of crushing out
liberty and erecting a despotism;” “a war for the freedom of the blacks
and the enslavement of the whites.”44 Vallandigham did not “counsel
resistance to military or civil law.” Instead, he urged his listeners to resist
at the ballot box and throw “King Lincoln” from his throne.45 That is
what Vallandigham said, according to witnesses for the prosecution.
Vallandigham does not seem to have violated any federal or state
law. He certainly was not charged with such a violation. Instead, he was
charged with violating an Order enacted by General Ambrose Burnside.
The order forbade “declaring sympathies for the enemy” and “treason,
express or implied.”46 The charge against Vallandigham was “publicly
expressing, in violation of General orders No. 38...sympathy for those in
arms against the Government of the United States, and declaring disloyal
sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the
power of the Government.”47 The charge was supported by a specification
of the words cited above. It was also supported by Vallandigham’s
assertion that Order 38 was a “base usurpation of arbitrary authority” and
that the people should tell “the minions of usurped power” that they
would not submit to such limits on their liberties. (Vallandigham also
said that his right to speak came from General Order No. 1, The
Constitution, not from General Order 38.)48 The evidence at
Vallandigham’s “trial” was that he coupled his harsh criticism of the war
44

THE TRIAL OF CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM BY A MILITARY COMMISSION
(Cincinnati, Rickey and Carrol 1863) 11-12 [hereafter, VALLANDIGHAM TRIAL].Id. at
310.
45
Id. at 22-23.
46
Id. at 7.
47
Id. at 11.
48
Id. at 14-15.
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policy of the Lincoln administration with a call for electoral action.49
For his speech, Vallandigham was seized by soldiers at his home,
placed on a sealed train, and sped away to face a military trial before a
“court” appointed by the general who ordered his arrest. Vallandigham
sought a writ of habeas corpus, but federal Judge Humphrey H. Leavitt
(an Andrew Jackson appointee) denied the writ. His opinion embraced
the necessity doctrine. The judge said that the Constitution must be
understood to recognize power to adapt to circumstances as “necessary to
meet a great emergency and save the nation from hopeless ruin. Self
preservation is a paramount law.”50 Here again we see the necessity
doctrine invoked and abused.
Instead of ingeniously finding the power to disregard
constitutional limitations in the requirement of the oath, supporters of
Lincoln’s actions cited the war power and the power of the president as
commander-in-chief. Still, this version of the necessity doctrine had an
effect similar to that for which Paulsen contends. The war power, a writer
in the Chicago Tribune announced, was “tremendous,” but “strictly
constitutional.” It broke “down every barrier so anxiously erected for the
protection of liberty.” The war required a dangerous concentration of
power in the hands of the executive, but the nation faced a choice of evils
and this was the lesser evil.51 Similarly, William Whiting, solicitor for the
War Department said the war power was constitutional, but not limited.
Military crimes included all acts of hostility to the country, the
government, or any department or officer thereof” if the act had the
“effect” of “even interfering with” the military or of “encouraging” the
enemy. Civilians who committed these military crimes were subject to
military arrest and trial.52 Several supporters of the necessity doctrine
(including Ralph Waldo Emerson) announced that it invested the

49

Id. at 22-24 (testimony of Captain John Means for the prosecution); 27
(testimony of Congressman S. S. Cox for the defense). See also “Vallandigham’s
Followers, ...,” CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, May 6, 1863, at 1 (news article from a
Republican paper reporting a Vallandigham speech) and CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra
note 24 at 312-13 .
50
Vallandigham Trial, supra note 44 at 262-64.
51
Military and Civil Law, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 12, 1863 and Military
and Civil Law –No. 3, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 18,1863 at 3. Curtis, Free Speech,
supra note 24 at 336-37.
52
CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 24 at 337.
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president with the powers of a “dictator.”53
The arrest of Vallandigham produced massive protests. Critics
generally called for peaceful resistance to what they saw as a gross
invasion of constitutional rights. George V. N. Lothrop, a former attorney
general of Michigan who “unreservedly” supported the war, insisted that
the arrest violated freedom of speech. His understanding of free speech
was simple and powerful: a man could not be arrested “for any quality of
opinions on public affairs” because “without free discussion there can be
no free government.” As a result, Vallandigham had the “full right to
approve, criticize or denounce the war and all acts and measures of the
administration at his pleasure. As a citizen he might form any opinion on
these subjects and freely express them.”54 Freedom of speech implied
“that men will honestly differ, and that the privilege of expression is to be
equal to all. The right of expression shall not depend upon...the quality
of the opinions in the judgment of another. The guaranty means this or
it means nothing.”55
The free speech-democracy argument was repeated again and
again. “If freedom of speech is surrendered,” said the Detroit Free Press,
“it will no longer be pretended, we presume, that the ballot box can
represent the views and wishes of the majority of the people...Without
freedom of speech, the ballot box is a farce.”56 By the same logic, the
paper noted, the president could dispense with elections. If it was disloyal
to speak against the war, it was doubly disloyal to vote for those who
opposed it.57
Others harkened back to arguments made against the Sedition Act
of 1798. In the American government, the people were the principal and
elected officials were merely their agents. As a result, the people must
retain the right to criticize the acts and policies of their agents and to
discuss replacing them.58 A number of Republicans and abolitionists
joined pro and anti-war Democrats in criticizing Vallandigham’s arrest

53
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Id. at 337.
Speech of Hon. Geo. V. N. Lothrop, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 7, 1862 at

2..
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Id.
Will the People Be Allowed to Vote, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 5, 1863, at

2.
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CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 24 at 325.
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and other acts of suppression.59
Critics of Vallandigham’s trial also complained about the violation
of other constitutional rights–including trial by jury and grand jury
indictment. They insisted that a military trial of civilians was not
permitted far from the scene of battle where the civilian courts were
functioning. At most, they insisted the power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus allowed imprisonment until a constitutional trial could be
held, not a trial by a military tribunal.60
Lincoln responded to his critics. He rejected the claim that
Vallandigham, as a person not in the military and not in the theater of war,
was entitled to a civilian trial with all Bill of Rights guarantees. Lincoln
insisted that the Civil War was a rebellion that allowed suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, and that the suspension allowed military trials.
Such arrests were preventative, made not because of what had been done,
but “for what probably would be done.” Those to be arrested, according
to Lincoln, included the “man who stands by and says nothing when the
peril of his country is discussed” and he who “talks ambiguously–talks for
his country with ‘buts’ and ‘ifs’ and ‘ands.’”61
In spite of the charge against Vallandigham and evidence offered
at his “trial,” Lincoln insisted that Vallandigham was not merely arrested
for “no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in
criticism of the course of the Administration and in condemnation of the
Military orders of the General.” If that were the case, Lincoln said, the
arrest was wrong. Instead, Vallandigham was arrested because he was
“laboring with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops; to encourage
desertions....”62 When challenged on this point, Lincoln responded
defensively. He admitted that “I certainly do not know that Mr. V. has
specifically, and by direct language, advised against enlistments, and in
favor of desertions, and resistance to drafting.”63 But that was the effect
of what he said, and Lincoln said (mistakenly) that “Mr. V.” had not
coupled his criticisms with a call to obey the law. “Must I shoot a simpleminded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair on the head
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Id. at 326-29
Id. at 342.
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of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?”64
Critics of the arrest found the defense outrageous. The Detroit
Free Press complained that Vallandigham was not charged with
encouraging desertions. The paper asked, if that was the offense, why was
he not charged with it?65
IV.

PROFESSOR PAULSEN ON LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES

Professor Paulsen considers the Vallandigham case in detail. He
praises Lincoln’s legal analysis in the Vallandigham case (as distinct
from his conclusion) in a beautifully written book review that is also an
engaging and important analysis of Lincoln as a constitutional actor.66
Professor Paulsen recognizes that most today would see some of
Lincoln’s actions “as violations of the freedom of speech and the due
process rights to trial by civilian courts and by jury.”67 But he doubts that
it is “really so easy to conclude that Lincoln’s actions were
unconstitutional, even in these instances....”68 (His most recent article
may suggest that he is beginning to find it easier.)69
Constitutionality turns on necessity, so if Lincoln were wrong
about necessity, his actions could also be wrong. Still, Paulsen notes,
Lincoln was the sole judge of necessity.70
Paulsen says that the proper evaluation of Lincoln’s approach
turns on whether it was consistent with the Constitution, not whether it
was consistent with later judicial doctrine.71 But to a remarkable extent
Paulsen insists that Lincoln anticipated later free speech doctrine. He tells
us Lincoln “spotted all the issues and wrestled thoughtfully with their
implications.”72 Paulsen sees four related constitutional principles in
Lincoln’s declarations in the Vallandigham case. I will set out the
64
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principles Paulsen finds and then discuss them.
1.

Lincoln as Anticipating Speech Plus Action Analysis

Paulsen sees Lincoln as distinguishing between “government
action ... [that] targets speech directly or targets conduct, producing an
incidental restriction of speech that is mixed together with such
conduct.”73 Paulsen finds this distinction in Lincoln’s statement that the
Vallandigham arrest would be wrong if based merely on words in a public
speech criticizing the “course of the Administration” and the “orders of
a General.”
But Paulsen notes that Lincoln said more was
involved–Vallandigham’s “laboring with some effect to prevent the
raising of troops” and “to encourage desertions from the army.”74
2.

Lincoln As Anticipating the Clear and Present Danger Test

Paulsen says, “Lincoln [defended] the less-harsh consequence of
the arrest when compared with alternative approaches and their attendant
harms (over fifty years before Learned Hand’s ... opinion employed a
similar calculus....)”75 This suggests that Paulsen finds Lincoln employing
something quite like Hand’s version of the “clear and present danger”
test.76 While Paulsen concedes that one can doubt the wisdom of
Lincoln’s application of these principles, he finds that Lincoln understood
the nature of the constitutional problem and formulated principles similar
to those later courts used. All the modern, more speech protective judicial
decisions, Paulsen suggests, are as debatable as Lincoln’s principles.77
3.

Lincoln as Anticipating and Applying the Compelling State
Interest Test

Paulsen also finds a strong resemblance to a compelling state
interest test in Lincoln’s references to what is required when confronting
73
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a rebellion. Paulsen notes that in modern doctrine a compelling state
interest can justify suppression of what would otherwise be protected
speech.78 He suggests that the modern compelling state interest test
supports Lincoln’s analysis in the Vallandigham case (if not his
application).79 After all, the need to preserve the Union was compelling.
Professor Paulsen sees Lincoln following an overarching, guiding
principle, one related to compelling state interest and clear and present
danger.
4.

The Anything Needed to Win Principle

For Paulsen, Lincoln correctly thought that his duty “to preserve,
protect, and defend the Union...required him–constitutionally required
him–to do what was necessary to win, even if it meant the temporary
sacrifice, during wartime, of other constitutional values. ... The need to
preserve the constitutional order... operates as a rule of construction for
other constitutional provisions.”80 By Lincoln’s theory, the president, as
Commander-in-Chief, was the sole judge of necessity.
V.

REFLECTIONS ON THE PAULSEN ANALYSIS

The suggestion that Lincoln anticipated modern judicial doctrine
makes his analysis seem less threatening. After all, if Lincoln is simply
applying modern principles, what is the fuss? I think that modern judicial
free speech principles are really quite different from anything Lincoln
suggested.
1.

Speech-Action

In the Vallandigham case Lincoln was not dealing with what we
now see as a speech-action problem. In his discussion of the
Vallandigham case, all of Lincoln’s specific references are to speeches,
not to communicative actions.
The general’s order that Vallandigham was accused of violating
targeted both conduct (spying) and words–(“disloyal sentiments”).
78
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Vallandigham was charged only with uttering words. The Vallandigham
case is not usefully seen as a speech-conduct problem because the charge
and evidence against Vallandigham were based exclusively on his words.
Lincoln also referred to Vallandigham’s speeches, and he did not specify
any other action unrelated to speeches. The laboring to prevent the raising
of troops that Lincoln refers to seems to refer only to Vallandigham’s
speeches. The speeches were the basis of the charge against
Vallandigham and the sole evidence on which he was convicted.
Speech-conduct cases involve expressive actions that create harms
independent of the expression. In such cases the actions also have an
expressive effect, such as a public burning of a draft card.81 As a result,
when the regulation targets the harm from the action (as opposed to the
harm from the expression), speech-conduct cases allow much greater
leeway for government suppression.
The speech-conduct approach is not usefully applied to the long
term persuasive effect of political speech on the minds of those who hear
it. The government must have the power to suppress much conduct that
is also expressive. Blowing up buildings to send a message is not
protected. The case for suppression of political speech because it may
have a “bad tendency” to give people the wrong political ideas is
subversive of the democratic right to speak critically on matters of public
concern.
The ambiguity in Lincoln’s analysis is not about conduct other
than speech. It is his distinction between: (1) what Vallandigham said in
his speech (or speeches) and (2) merely criticizing the course of the
administration and the action of a general. Did Lincoln think one could
criticize the way the administration was conducting the war for the Union,
but not the war itself? From his remarks, it is impossible to say.
Finally, Paulsen notes that Lincoln believed that some
constitutional actor must make the ultimate judgment of the degree of
necessity; in time of war, the president was that actor.82
2.

Clear and Present Danger
There are some resemblances between what Lincoln said to justify
81
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punishment of Vallandigham and the Dennis83 plurality’s weakened
version of the “clear and present danger” test–a version largely
superceded by the Brandenburg84 test. It is true that Lincoln was
grappling with problems that recur and weighing costs and benefits. How
should we treat wartime speech that has a tendency to harm the (perhaps
misguided) war effort? In modern cases, the clear and present danger
doctrine has been applied to advocacy of unlawful action.
In understanding Judge Hand’s “clear and present danger test” to
which Paulsen refers,85 the context is important. That context in Dennis
was a case against defendants who were officers of the Communist Party
of the United States. The trial court had found that they had advocated
revolution–albeit in the future.
This requirement of advocacy of lawbreaking as part of clear and
present danger is highlighted by Judge Hand’s earlier Masses86 opinion.
Scholars have seen the Masses opinion as the source of the advocacy
requirement in the modern clear and present danger doctrine. In Masses,
Judge Hand considered dissenting speech in wartime. The Postmaster
General had denied mailing privileges to The Masses, a magazine that had
harshly criticized the First World War. Because mailing is crucial to the
survival of most magazines, the decision was a death sentence for the
magazine.
Publications could be denied mailing privileges if they violated the
1917 Espionage Act, which made it a crime to cause or attempt to cause
insubordination in the military or naval forces or to obstruct recruiting or
enlistment. Though technically Hand was construing the statute, in fact
his decision was strongly influenced by what he considered the correct
constitutional principle.
Judge Hand frankly recognized that harsh criticism of the war
83
Dennis v. United States, 391 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (Upholding convictions
of leaders of the Communist Party U.S.A. for teaching the necessity of violent
overthrow of the government as soon as possible.
84
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (reversing conviction of KKK
speaker who suggested violence might be needed if the Supreme Court and others
continued to oppress the white race).
85
Cf,. Paulsen, Interpretation, supra note 38 at 701. Again I think the Hand
calculus referred to comes from Dennis, not Masses. See text accompanying notes 65
and 66 to this article, supra.
86
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) reversed,
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could, and in some cases would, interfere with recruiting and enlistment.
But he rejected the conclusion that the bad tendency justified suppression
of political speech.
Political agitation, by the passions it arouses or the convictions
it engenders, may in fact stimulate men to the violation of the
law. Detestation of existing policies is easily transformed into
forcible resistance of the authority which puts them into
execution, and it would be folly to disregard the causal relation
between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as
such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to
disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation
which in normal times is a safeguard of free government. The
distinction is not a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought
acquisition in the fight for freedom.... If one stops short of
urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist
the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have
attempted to cause its violation. If that be not the test, I can see
no escape from the conclusion that under this section every
political agitation which can be shown to be apt to create a
seditious temper is illegal.87

Hand was unwilling to punish political agitation that falls short of
urging people to resist the law. The speech for which Vallandigham was
punished did not urge people to violate the law. So Vallandigham’s
speech would have been protected by the Hand principle in Masses, as
opposed to the Lincoln principle. Though Lincoln seems to have been
unaware of the fact, Vallandigham went further than the Hand rule would
have required. He explicitly urged his hearers to obey the law and to seek
redress at the polls.88
Later, in the Communist Party case of United States v. Dennis,89
Judge Hand crafted a watered down version of the clear and present
danger test.90 The new test was based on the gravity of the evil discounted
by its improbability, and it was embraced by a plurality of the Supreme
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Court.91 Hand found the evil of a Communist revolution (or attempted
revolution) was quite great, so not much probability of revolution being
attempted was required. Still, advocacy of lawless action survived as an
element of the Dennis test. The trial court submitted the issue to the jury,
and the Dennis jury found that the defendants had organized the Party to
teach and had taught the duty and necessity of overthrowing the
government as soon as circumstances would permit.92 The finding, which
was contrary to the claims of the defendants, was sustained by the Court
of Appeals.
Read in light of the full opinion, the principle of Hand’s Dennis
opinion and the principle of the Dennis plurality in the Supreme Court is
again quite different from the principle Lincoln espoused. The gravity of
the evil discounted by its improbability was a test to be applied to
advocacy of illegal action. It was applied where the court found that
defendants had organized the Party to advocate illegal action–albeit in the
future.93 Dennis sharply distinguished advocacy of change through the
political process from advocacy of revolution.94 The distinction is crucial,
however dubious Dennis is as a standard applied to teaching the ultimate
need for revolution as opposed to a conspiracy to revolt, bomb, etc.
As we have seen, Vallandigham did not explicitly advocate illegal
action. Lincoln virtually conceded as much in his second letter on the
91
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case. In fact, Vallandigham urged obedience to the law.95 So even under
the Dennis test, Vallandigham’s speech should have been protected. The
principle embraced by the plurality during the Cold War was significantly
more speech protective than Lincoln’s.
Although Vallandigham explicitly advocated obedience to the law
and lawful political action, his speeches may have produced illegal action.
However, as Judge Hand observed in Masses, any criticism of a war may
have that result. If the necessity principle allows suppression of all
criticism of the war, it suspends the democratic process and the right of
“we the people” to consult together about the wisest course–a right
especially important in wartime.
3.

The Compelling State Interest Test

Paulsen implies that Lincoln was simply balancing the right of
dissent against the evils it would produce, and he says that this is quite
similar to the compelling state interest test.96 The principle seems to be
that otherwise protected speech advocating political change by peaceful
means may be suppressed to advance a compelling state interest. This
approach is not compatible with the idea that the people, not the officers
of the government, are sovereign, and therefore must be allowed to hear
dissenting speech so they can participate in charting the nation’s course.
Recent cases do not support silencing mere political speech that harshly
criticizes public measures and people in public life and calls for political
change. If the president alone makes the decision that there is a
compelling interest justifying suppression of political speech, the
principle is especially troubling, even if the test is limited to wartime.
If not limited to wartime, silencing political speech advocating
peaceful political change for “compelling” reasons could have silenced
much dissenting speech in American history. For example, the approach
would have justified the suppression of anti-slavery speech based on fears
of slave revolts and of sectional strife leading to disunion and civil war.97
The argument from necessity is the same in both cases. Slave
revolts and civil war were very great evils. It is, in fact, hard to
95
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distinguish this type of compelling interest test from a bad tendency test.
Since the 1930s, the principle has not been applied to political speech that
did not advocate violation of the law. Such speech has been protected,
even in wartime. Julian Bond, for example, was protected in endorsing
criticisms of the Vietnam war that were at least as harsh and likely to
cause draft resistance as those Vallandigham made of the Civil War.98
4.

The Anything Needed to Win Principle

Closely related to the compelling state interest argument is another
claim: Lincoln’s guiding constitutional principle during the Civil War was
that the government had all necessary power to do anything needed to
preserve the Union. Lincoln claimed that since some constitutional actor
should decide these questions, the decision should rest with the
Commander-in-Chief.
The “anything needed to win” principle for time of war seems
clear. The executive branch can try a citizen for a political speech if the
citizen violates a rule enacted by the president or one of his generals.
Advocacy of peaceful change can be punished. No statute passed by
Congress is required. The citizen can be “tried” by a military commission
staffed by decision makers chosen by the general who enacted the rule and
initiated the prosecution. And all this can be done in places where no
battle rages. The executive legislates, adjudicates, punishes, and reviews.
There is a principle here–that the executive’s claim of necessity in
practice trumps the free speech right to advocate political change at the
ballot box if that advocacy is coupled with harsh criticism of the
administration. But it is a principle to be avoided. Indeed, Professor
Paulsen seems to be backing even further away from it.
Since we are debating it, the question is of course “debatable.”
But are the merits of the pro and con arguments equivalent? As we will
see, in one of his most thoughtful moments, Lincoln rejected “anything
necessary to win” as the ultimate constitutional principle.
VI. Dealing With the Lincoln “Precedent.”
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In this section I consider problems with treating Lincoln as a
model to justify vast, largely unchecked, unilateral presidential
power–power that suspends other constitutional rights and liberties.
These reflections are divided into two parts. Part A focuses on Lincoln
and his actions. First, I argue that Lincoln’s actions in the Vallandigham
case should not be treated as a precedent, because they are a clear abuse
of power. Second, I examine the Lincoln precedent in the Vallandigham
case and suggest ways to undermine it. Third, I point out that concessions
made by Lincoln himself seriously undermine the apparently compelling
logical argument that necessity supercedes other constitutional limitations.
Part B reflects further on crisis and broad power. One serious
danger is the exploitation of crises for partisan political purposes. In
addition, I respond to the idea that we need not worry about suspension
of civil liberties in times of emergency because the suspensions are brief
and produce no long term effects.
The conclusion looks further at the dangers of unilateral
unchecked presidential power and the serious dangers posed by
acceptance of the argument that such power is, in times of crisis at least,
entirely legal and constitutional.
A. A Closer Look at the Vallandigham Precedent
1. Lincoln’s Vallandigham Actions Were a Clear Abuse
of Power. His Justifications Were Specious.
Unless one accepts suspension of freedom of speech in wartime,
Lincoln actions cannot be justified. The suspension of free speech
implies that an elite should decide whether the war is wise, should be
continued, and is worth the harm it inflicts. These would be matters that
ordinary citizens must not discuss. They could serve in battle, sacrifice
sons and daughters, pay taxes, and suffer all the costs and benefits of war.
But they could not discuss its wisdom. That approach is inconsistent with
the basic idea of popular sovereignty.
In spite of Lincoln’s claims, the facts of Vallandigham’s case are
clear. He was prosecuted for words he uttered in a political speech.
Vallandigham was tried on specific charges and evidence was offered at
the trial. The charge recited the words of his speech; the evidence was
also based only on his words. It showed that he had not counseled draft
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resistance or illegal conduct. If one accepts application of the basic due
process idea that people can only be convicted of crimes with which they
are charged and for which evidence is produced, then the Vallandigham
verdict cannot be justified. It cannot be justified, that is, under any
principle more protective than one allowing suppression of political
speech in wartime because it may cause future harm. Since Lincoln
upheld the conviction, his action cannot be justified either–if free speech
or due process applies outside the zone of battle while the nation is at war.
Of course, if one accepts the “necessity principle,” applies the logic fully,
and leaves that issue to the president, then the game is over.
Another approach is to suggest that whatever his words,
Vallandigham’s intent was treasonous. The problem with this approach
is that almost any anti-war speech could be silenced by the same
assumption of treasonous intent. Basically, this approach accepts the idea
that during war time any speech with a bad tendency–that may cause
problems for national unity and the war effort–can be suppressed. Some
of Lincoln’s rhetoric in the Vallandigham case can be cited to support the
bad tendency approach.
Lincoln’s made a politically powerful rejoinder to critics of the
Vallandigham arrest: he asserted Vallandigham’s bad intent. It was
Lincoln’s “wily agitator” defense:
Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while
I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to
desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting
a father, or brother, or friend, into a public meeting, and there
working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the
soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked
Administration of a contemptible Government, too weak to
arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a
case to silence the agitator, and save the boy is not only
constitutional, but withal a great mercy.99

As noted above, an anti-war speech that does not advocate
breaking the law may cause a father, brother, or friend to write a soldier
with the sentiments Lincoln condemns. Basically, the wily agitator
justification presumes a criminal intent on the part of the agitator. The
99
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presumption is hard to refute and subject to abuse. The fact that the
“agitator” does not advocate violating the law simply shows how “wily”
he is. Does the agitator urge people to obey the law and seek redress at
the polls? That could be taken as proof that he is even “wilier.” Even
specific denunciation of illegal acts (a factor Lincoln says would weigh
strongly in Vallandigham’s favor if it had occurred–which it did) could
be interpreted simply as proof that the agitator is extremely “wily.”
Professor Geoffrey Stone, a leading expert on free speech law,
notes another problem with Lincoln’s “simple-minded soldier boy”
argument. We cannot protect democratic discourse if the test is to be the
effect of speeches on the “simple-minded” or the most susceptible
members of the audience.100 Just as it is inappropriate to reduce adults to
reading material fit for children, it is inappropriate to reduce voters to
hearing only things not likely to mislead the simple minded.
There are few mistakes for which one cannot find a precedent.
Before the Civil War, Southern states such as North Carolina banned antislavery speech that had a tendency to produce discontent in slaves. The
North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the statute to prohibit giving
Hinton Helper’s anti-slavery book to whites.101 The effect of the decision
was to reduce white voters to reading material fit for slaves.
2. Further Undermining the Vallandigham Precedent
Though not a judicial decision, Lincoln’s action in
Vallandigham’s case is a precedent. There are, however, reasons to treat
the Vallandigham precedent as a very weak one that should make us
suspicious of invocation of “necessity.” Of course, we have Lincoln’s
public justifications of the Vallandigham arrest and verdict. But we now
also have the historical record. It shows that while Lincoln and his
cabinet defended the arrest publicly, in private cabinet members doubted
its wisdom, lawfulness, or necessity.102 Second, also in private dispatches,
100
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Lincoln reined in his generals, a clear indication that in his own mind the
Vallandigham precedent was not one to be lightly repeated.103 Third,
when Burnside struck again and banned publication of the Chicago Times,
Lincoln countermanded the order.104
3. Lincoln’s Statement on Elections Undermines His
Necessity Argument
Finally, and most significantly, in 1864 Lincoln strongly defended
the need for free elections even in the midst of a civil war. We cannot
have free elections without free speech. So in the end, Lincoln’s wise
statements on the need for free elections undermines the force of his
Vallandigham arguments. His statements also undermine the “anything
to win” principle. He recognized democracy as a principle that should not
be sacrificed even “temporarily” to “win.”
The damage Lincoln’s concession inflicts on the “anything to win”
approach goes far beyond the need to allow elections. Meaningful
elections require free speech. Elections and free speech are part of the
larger ecology of political freedom, but only part. Justice Black
understood this point well. He wrote in his Adamson dissent about the
ecological effect of the criminal procedure guarantees of the Bill of
Rights:
Past history provided strong reasons for the apprehensions
which brought these procedural amendments into being and
attest the wisdom of their adoption. For fears of arbitrary court
action sprang largely from the past use of courts in the
imposition of criminal punishments to suppress speech, press,
and religion. Hence the constitutional limits of courts’s powers
were, in the view of the Founders, essential supplements to the
First Amendment, which was itself designed to protect the
widest scope for all people to believe and express the most
divergent political, religious, and other views....105

While Justice Black refers to the powers of the courts, the
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argument applies with greater force to decisions by the executive to
imprison people without any of the safeguards of the Bill of Rights.
Indeed, many of the early claims for the criminal procedure rights now in
the Bill of Rights arose in the 17th Century struggle for greater democracy
and greater political and religious liberty. Supporters of greater
democracy and religious toleration confronted an oligarchic Parliament
and Council of State determined to suppress their pamphlets, petitions,
and political activity.106 Those in power used arrests, searches, selfincriminating questions, and denial of habeas corpus to suppress these
early democrats and advocates of religious toleration. Many of the basic
rights now in our Bill of Rights were asserted by the Leveller John
Lilburne in response to the repeated prosecutions he faced for his prodemocracy political activity. Juries refused to convict him, but in the end
Cromwell simply arrested Lilburne and put him outside the reach of
habeas corpus.107 No doubt Cromwell found his decision to ignore basic
legal rights justified by necessity.
The limited definition of treason in the Constitution comes from
the Treasons Trials Act of 1696. That act was a response to the habit of
the party in control of Parliament to use the courts to convict and execute
their political opponents for treason.108 The doctrine of necessity, with the
ultimate power effectively with the executive, makes suppression much
simpler.
B. Reasons to Worry About Using Precedents Such as the Vallandigham
One to Support Broad and Unchecked Executive Power
1. The Grave Danger of Use of Crisis for Abusive
Political Purposes
There are additional reasons to be leery of treating the
Vallandigham case as a precedent to be followed. Lincoln’s precedent
106
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may not always be applied either by a Lincoln or by the Lincoln popular
history has canonized . There is always the danger that politicians will
use times of genuine crisis to advance narrow partisan agendas. In the
case of the Sedition Act, for example, one Federalist senator wrote that
the crisis with France would provide a glorious opportunity to destroy
“faction”–by which he meant to destroy the Jeffersonian party.109
Genuine fears of slave revolts in the South were used by some as a pretext
to silence those who advocated emancipation by the Southern states.110
According to Geoffrey Stone, Republican politicians used the Cold War
threat from the Soviet Union to charge that the Democratic Party was the
party of Communism. The chairman of the Republican Party announced
that the “Democratic party policy...bears a made-in-Moscow label.”111
Richard Nixon described the Democratic Party as the “party of
Communism” and charged that President Truman and Democratic
candidate Adlai Stevenson were “traitors.”112 The recurring tendency to
use crisis and necessity as a device to destroy one’s political opponents
shows the grave danger in an unbridled “necessity trumps all rights”
analysis. Rejection of the idea that the opposition is loyal is deeply
subversive to democratic government.
Though Lincoln was not motivated by narrow political advantage,
some who attacked anti-war speech during the Civil War had mixed
motives. In 1864, Republicans sought to expel an Ohio Congressman for
a speech on the floor of the House in which he advocated peace and
recognition of the Confederacy. At the same time Republicans were
claiming the speech would undermine the military, they were reprinting
copies for use as a campaign document.113
2. A Fallacy: “Don’t Worry: As the Lincoln Case Shows
We Suppress in Times of Crisis and Spring Back.”
The constitutional war power is important. But, as Justice Robert
H. Jackson wrote in 1948, it is also “the most dangerous to free
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government in the whole catalogue of powers.”114 He explained that this
was because it is “usually invoked in haste and excitement when calm
legislative consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult. It is
executed at a time of patriotic fervor that makes moderation unpopular.
And, worst of all, it is interpreted by the Judges under the influence of the
same passions and pressures. Always...the Government urges hasty
decision to forestall some emergency...and pleads that paralysis will result
if its claims to power are denied....”115
Some give a tranquilizing answer to people who have seen
alarming dangers to civil liberty in the response to our present crisis. In
the long run, they assure us, we need not worry: We suppress civil liberty
in crisis times. A few years later when the crisis is over, we spring back.
Those concerned with long term effects might infer that there is little need
to protest even serious “temporary” incursions on civil liberties. This
comforting analysis leaves out too much of the story and too many of the
hazards of repression.
By the temporary emergency analysis, most of our wars and crises
have lasted only a few years. There is another way to look at it. Since
World War II, we have had a succession of “wars,” that have lasted
almost without interruption–the Cold War, the Korean War, the War in
Vietnam, and now the war in Iraq. In any case, the current war on
terrorism has no clear end. But there are deeper reasons to be dubious of
tranquilizing reassurances.
Many suppressions of civil liberty produced massive protest at the
time. The protests limited repression and hastened the restoration of
liberty. That was the case, for example, in the 1798 Sedition Act (passed
during an undeclared naval war with France).116 Again, from the 1830s
to the Civil War, advocates of suppression used mobs and attempted to
pass laws to silence abolitionists in the North. The attacks on free speech
produced strong public protest that helped defeat attempts to suppress
Northern criticism of slavery.117 Public protest also limited repression
during the Civil War. Criticism of repression in World War I was limited
and repression was widespread. Still, critics helped to produce a stronger
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protection for free speech and civil liberty in later years.118 Where protest
was muted, however, repression thrived.
The long term negative effects of acquiescence in repression can
be seen in the history of the American South. The South from 1830 to the
Civil War was gripped by fear of slave revolts. Southern laws silenced
critics of slavery, eventually including members of Lincoln’s Republican
party. Criticism of slavery was treated as a crime–even if the recipient of
the criticism was another white person. Mobs often made resort to law
unnecessary.119 The denial of civil liberty produced little protest in the
South, and repression continued until the end of the Civil War.120
But it did not end even then. Earlier support for repression helped
grease the skids for Klan terrorism aimed at the multi-racial Southern
Republican party. In the end, with remarkably little protest, the nation
accepted suppression of civil liberty and racist laws that deprived black
people in the South of the right to vote. All told, the repression lasted
over 130 years. There was comparatively little protest against the
incarceration of Americans of Japanese descent during World War II. It
took the nation nearly half a century to begin to make amends.
There is still another reasons to doubt the “we always recover so
no harm is done” analysis. The Lincoln precedent probably made later
abuses seem more acceptable.
Of course, there is also a silver lining in the cloud of censorship.
Public commitment of many citizens to broad free speech rights helped
to limit repression.121 Democratic protests (and those of many
Republicans) limited repression and forced Lincoln to disclaim any
attempt to interfere with elections.122 Still, the Lincoln administration’s
departure from free speech principles had both short and long-term
negative consequences.
Lincoln’s defense of Vallandigham’s trial created a precedent to
118
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be relied on expressly or implicitly by future decision makers. For
example, Lincoln’s idea that rebellion justified suppressing
Vallandigham’s anti-war speech probably had a considerable influence on
the justices during World War I, including Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
In 1919, Holmes, writing for the Court, upheld the jailing of one man for
sending a leaflet to draftees that called for political action against the
draft.123 He also wrote the opinion that upheld the jailing of Eugene Debs,
the Socialist politician and labor leader, for making an anti-war speech.124
Other anti-war advocates met a similar fate.125 “When a nation is
at war,” Justice Holmes wrote in Schenck v. United States, “many things
that might be said in times of peace will not be endured....”126 One could
oppose the war before it began and after it was over. The principle
Lincoln invoked for “rebellion” slid easily into a principle for wartime
generally. It should come as no surprise. Supporters of the Lincoln
Administration often invoked a virtually unlimited war power.
Punishment of anti-war speech by the Lincoln administration was
the first federal criminal prosecution of political speech since the nation
repudiated the Sedition Act. Military suppression of reactionary anti-war
speech during the Civil War may well have paved the way for civil
suppression of socialist and other anti-war speech during World War I.
The World War I story is not an edifying one. During this period
of hysteria, many were convicted of crimes who should not have been.
The victims included a man who told women knitting socks for soldiers
that no soldier would see them, a man who refused to kiss the flag, and a
movie producer whose film suggested atrocities by the British during the
American Revolution.127 At least in these cases, people were charged
with violating a law passed by Congress or a state legislature and the trials
were held before civilian judges and juries. Still, most see these as
precedents showing what should be avoided, and they are right.
Mistakes are more likely in times of great peril and fear. Franklin
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Roosevelt, listening to his generals after the bombing of Pearl Harbor,
approved a military plan to incarcerate Americans of Japanese descent.
The war power theory generated to support suppression of speech by the
Lincoln administration supports the constitutionality of the Japanese
internment.128 One could respond that the internment of the Japanese was
not necessary and therefore was not constitutional. Similarly, the arrest
of Vallandigham could be rejected as unnecessary. But if the president is
in effect the judge of necessity the distinction suggested for the
incarceration of the Japanese does not amount to much. Of course, all
branches of government can fail, as happened in the case of the Japanese
internment. Still, liberty is better protected by more rather than fewer
checks. Redundant safety devices are generally a good idea, as the failure
to have an adequate number of life boats on the Titantic shows.
The question raised by Lincoln’s actions in the Vallandigham case
is not whether the war power provides vast sources of power which would
otherwise not exist. It is whether this vast power may be used to suspend
free speech and the democratic process in areas outside the theater of war.
VII. CONCLUSION:
REFLECTIONS ON UNCHECKED
PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO SUSPEND CIVIL LIBERTIES
The “anything to win principle” (with the President as the judge)
quickly slides into an “anything that might be necessary to win” principle.
Why take a chance? From there it easily becomes (as it seems to have in
Vallandigham’s case and even more clearly in the case of the Sedition
Act) an “anything that can be defended as necessary to win” principle. In
“application,” the principle can produce paradoxical results, undermining
the legitimacy of the cause of those who invoke it.129 When application
shows a principle so liable to produce abuse and disaster, it is reasonable
to doubt the wisdom of the principle.
One problem with the Paulsen approach and his use of the Lincoln
analogy is that it confuses political with legal analysis. It seeks to make
actions outside the law and the Constitution into lawful and constitutional
128

Id., at 355.
For a somewhat related issue see, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Making Torture
Legal, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 4 (July 15, 2004) and Tim Golden, In U.S.
Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates Deaths, NEW YORK TIMES, May 20, 2005
at A-1 (describing the torture killing of an apparently innocent Afghan taxi driver)..
129

38

LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

actions. The effect of this is to make violating the law and the
Constitution too easy and too acceptable and to obscure the difficult moral
and political choices involved.130
If torture is prohibited by law, a faithful legal adviser would tell
a president that torture is illegal. He would not announce that it is legal
because it is necessary or legal provided the subject of torture is not killed
or subjected to the pain of the sort involved in the slowest and most
painful death. The president would then be faced with a decision as to
whether to violate the law. Knowing that he was violating the law would
give the president pause, as well it should. He might still decide that
necessity was so overwhelming that action outside the law is required.
Maintaining the distinction between what is constitutional and lawful on
one hand and what is “necessary” matters. The distinction helps the
president focus on whether the unlawful or unconstitutional action is not
just useful, but so clearly and urgently necessary that the law must be
broken.
Civil disobedience is a useful analogy. Those who engage in civil
disobedience do not claim that their action is lawful. They claim instead
that a higher authority justifies breaking the law. Obviously, if a finding
that law violation would be “useful” or “convenient” or “necessary” made
law breaking lawful, the law would lose much of its force. In contrast to
civil disobedience, the president has substantial protection even if he
engages in unlawful conduct. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court held the
president absolutely immune from damages even for intentional violations
of clearly established law.131
There is, of course, a second problem. The Lincoln-necessity
analogy puts essentially unchecked power in the hand of one person, and
does so for the foreseeable future. To accept this elimination of checks
on power, one needs to go beyond unquestioning trust in George W.
Bush. One needs to trust that the power will not be seriously abused by
any of his successors for the next hundred years or more that the problem
of terrorism continues.
Recent ghastly experiences have led judges and scholars to
express deep concern about claims of unilateral presidential power. The
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Court addressed the power of the president in time of war in Youngstown
Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer. Justice Jackson, in particular, recalled the
slide of Germany into tyranny. During the Korean War President
Truman claimed power to seize the steel mills. He acted as Commanderin-Chief in time war with the announced goal of preventing disruption of
the supply of steel from a pending strike. As Chief Justice Vinson wrote
in his dissent, Truman immediately informed Congress of his action and
“clearly stated his intent to abide by the legislative will.”132 Still the
majority of the Court found the President had violated the Constitution.
As Justice Robert Jackson noted in his concurring opinion in
Youngstown:
Germany after the First Word War, framed the Weimar
Constitution, designed to secure her liberties in the Western
tradition. However, the President of the Republic, without
concurrence of the Reichstag, was empowered temporarily to
suspend any or all individual rights if public safety and order
were seriously disturbed or endangered. This proved a
temptation to every government, whatever its shade of opinion,
and in 13 years suspension of rights was invoked on more than
250 occasions. Finally, Hitler persuaded President Von
Hindenburg to suspend all such rights, and they were never
restored.133

The Court’s concern and that of Justice Jackson was not that the “kindly”
Harry Truman was or would become a Hitler. It was that the precedent
of unilateral power would be abused by later, less trustworthy leaders.
Those who express such concerns know that unilateral, unchecked
executive power will not always and inevitably progress to despotism.
But in light of history, they fear the risk is simply too great.
Professor J. G. Merrils and A. H. Roberson, in their book, Human
Rights in Europe say that the Council of Europe committed itself to the
declaration and protection of human rights because of the
grim experience through which Europe had passed during the
132
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years immediately preceding the [1949] creation of the
Council. ... [T]hey were aware that the first steps towards
dictatorship are the gradual suppression of individual
rights–infringement of the freedom of the Press, prohibition of
public meetings, and trials behind closed doors, for example–
and that once this process has started it becomes increasingly
difficult to stop.134

They quote M. Pierre-Henri Tietgen speaking to the issue in 1949.
“Democracies do not become Nazi countries in one day. Evil progresses
cunningly, with a minority operating, as it were, to remove the levers of
control. One by one, freedoms are suppressed....”135
The Vallandigham case and the protest it produced helped to
produce Lincoln’s eventual statements that suspending elections would
not be justified–not even if it was necessary to win the Civil War. For in
the end Lincoln recognized that there is more than one way to lose the
Constitution.
Lincoln concluded that suspending elections and
democratic government because the wrong side might win would itself be
a mortal blow aimed to the Constitution. To his great credit, Abraham
Lincoln rejected the logical application of the necessity and “anything to
win” principles he had done so much to craft.
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